What does it mean to allow human being to emerge as a locus of philosophical investigation? Any attempt to clarify this question is already to take up the concerns of a philosophical anthropology. From within the purview of this project a philosophical anthropology is that which address the question of the being of being human.
1 Its concerns therefore are ontological rather than simply ethnological. And yet, it should not be thought that the question is a novel one. Indeed, the contrary is the case.
The contention here is that the history of philosophy is marked by the continual engagement with and attempt to answer that question. The undertaking of this paper, while it concedes the centrality of that address, approaches the concerns of a philosophical anthropology from within what can best be described as the space created by the overlap of the history of theology and the history of the image. 2 That space and its interconnected components are there to be recovered and transformed once the question of the being of being human is given as much an historical inflection as it is a philosophical one. This allows the historical to figure within the philosophical. Equally, it allows for a critical engagement that opens up the possibility for the reconfiguration of a philosophical anthropology.
Programmatically, therefore, such an approach entails that the locus of investigation has to have a specific setting. Recovery and transformation demand it. The set of texts that comprise that setting here are the three treatises written by St John of Damascus between 726 and the early 740s CE and are published as Three Treatises on the Divine Images. Three interrelated preliminary points guiding the approach taken here need to be identified. The first is to note that part of what has to be demonstrated within this regional concern is that any attempt to engage human being under the guise of a form of neutrality, as if there were just an open field, is there in name alone rather than being real. Neutrality remains a feint, 3 despite appearances. In other words, inclusion and exclusion, processes which would work to stem the possibility of neutrality, from the realm of the human not only have historical force, they present the philosophical with an ineliminable demand.
Secondly, one of the most persistent elements in any attempt to respond to the question of the being of being human posits a divide at the centre of human being. There are many examples. They may involve a divide in which the body is separated from the soul; or the animal (even human animal) from that which is properly human. As positions such as these are developed -and they will have internal contradictions and limits inscribed within them -other areas of concern are drawn into consideration.
The one that is central here is the tradition in which the marker of human propriety is located in those unique elements which identify the specifically human by defining human perfectibility in relation to the identification of the human as that which is created in the 'image' and 'likeness' of God.
Given this setting the question to be addressed concerns the meaning of 'image'.
Answering this question, from one perspective, occurs at the limit of religion, indeed both question and answer may resist any straightforward incorporation into the domain of the religious. What occurs within the question is the identification of an element of human being that is there in excess of mere bodily presence. To the extent that, for example, 'dignity' is present as an addition to simple empirical presence with the result that slavery can then be understood as the elimination of human dignity that still maintains the body as extant, it follows that the critique of slavery in the name of human dignity will have recourse to the very structure of thought which, while conceding an initial equation of human being with empirical presence, refuses any final reduction of one to the other. The important point here is that once this position is sanctioned what is then conceded is the presence of a form of doubling that marks the being of being human at the origin. Within the history of theology this position is initially formulated 4 In the second instance, the problem of the image becomes more emphatic once the concerns with the history of the image within the realm of art (or that which is positioned as art) are themselves confronted by the sense of actualization and presence that occurs with the claim that the figure of Christ is directly related to God. The presence of Christ is one resolution to the question of the status of the image.
Moreover, once this setting is taken into consideration then Christology, itself unthinkable outside the logic of incarnation (i.e. not the 'fact' of incarnation, but the ensuing logic that secures it), rather than being an event within the history of religion, has to be understood as an event that ties together that history with both an accompanying concern with the icon/image and the continual engagement with a specific conception of a philosophical anthropology. 5 The latter, the continuity of engagement, has to follow insofar as what it means to be human -the being of being humanis defined here by a relation to God where this is an ontological consideration, and is present in the form of an image having actuality. The counter measure therefore opens the possibility that even though the founding doubling is retained, this occurs without there being the subsequent commitment to the incorporation of the image into a set of relations defined by both sight and immediacy. Integral to any undertakings that such an opening allows is the point noted at the outset concerning the impossibility of neutrality. (This will become the problem of the figure.) As a result there would be the possibility of a philosophical anthropology that was defined neither by the image nor, as will be suggested further, by immediacy. And, it will also be the case that the feint of neutrality in being exposed would then allow for the inscription of relationality, power and difference as components integral to the development of that anthropology.
Central therefore to understanding how this initial setting works, and thus identifying that which yields the possibility of a counter measure, is the presence of a founding set of relations between God, the human and the image. (Relations that follow from the third point of orientation -i.e. the Christological -noted above.) The question therefore is how, in that particular context, is relationality to be understood? As will emerge that 6 conception of relationality is the problem of the economic, that is, the problem set in play by the use of the term oikonomia.
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The presence of a set of relations, always already interconnected relations -oikonomia -defined by modalities of sameness rather than identity, occurring between God, the human and the image has two important consequences. The development of a critical engagement with the conception of a philosophical anthropology emerging from these relations has to engage them. Engagement is the precondition for any subsequent reconfiguration. The first consequence is the creation of a set up in which a series of elements cohere. Within this setting there are important connections. There are, for example, significant points of contact between the cosmological and the anthropological. What is accomplished as part of this process is the development of a specific configuration of human being. This is the first point. Then secondly there is the creation of a figure.
The figure -in this instance it will be the figure of the Jew -is a mode of human being whose existence is created in order that it then be excluded.
(The creation of the figure undermines the possibility of any sense of assumed universality or neutrality within the detailed development of a philosophical anthropology.) There is the important additional point namely that this exclusion is itself fundamental to the maintenance of the identity of that from which the figure is constructed in order then to be excluded.
Consequently, the argument would be that the identity in question depends Again, at stake here are both sameness and more importantly the immediacy of sameness. That immediacy is twofold. It is sameness as a relation without mediation, and secondly, it is a relation whose recognition (or observation) occurs immediately (i.e. occurring in the now of its happening). In other words, it is immediate because it is both without mediation and immediately there to be seen. In regards to the latter John Damascene argues is De Fide Orthodoxa that: "'We' attribute to Christ a human energeia because we perceive this economy in Christ" 7 (59.24). In general terms microcosm/macrocosm is a mode of relationality in which two conditions obtain. Firstly, there is a both a possibility -and thus an envisaged actuality -of relation between the human and Christ. Secondly, this possibility is there to be seen. Not only must there be the relation, the relation in being present to the subject, being a subject is then delimited by that seeing. To be therefore is to see within the presence of this economy.
To see the relation's presence is thus to have been inscribed within it.
Consequently, the state of not seeing, or being deemed to be the one who 8 does not see, or, more emphatically not being able to see, creates the situation and thus the predicament of exclusion. The designation of being the one who does not see reinforces both the identity of the set of relations, equally the identities within it, and the continuity of the process of exclusion. As will became clear the Jew's figured presence is an effect of the mode of relationality that is envisaged. As has already been suggested relationality is named within the tradition by the term oikonmoia. As significantly the macrocosm/microcosm relation is an object observed by a subject. Hence the following questions: Who observes? The text is clear:
'we see' (θεωρουμεν). Hence the question: Who is the 'we' that perceives?
The question of the 'we' is the question of how the being of being human is thought within such a context. In other words, the question -Who is the 'we'? -depends upon an immediacy that excludes figured Jews.
At work within the setting of this economy is the 'word' that has become flesh. ( Present within these two passages is the question of time, the conditions in terms of which images/icons can be produced and the subject position that they then demand. The response to that demand that occurs here is 'veneration'. (And it should be noted that 'veneration' is not an option. It defines the object, more significantly however it delimits the state of being a subject.) As the first passage makes clear there is an interruption in time that charges the present with an intensity that had not been there hitherto.
John writes, 'now that God has been seen in the flesh' Hence, the conjecture here is that what is significant has two interrelated elements. In while the economic is 'believing while seeing' is not simply true but had far greater implications than had been thought hitherto. 16 In the precise sense that belief has become central and that the link between belief and sight redefine the relation to God in terms of immediacy. Before returning to the slave as a position within a structure of immediate relationality, some further elaboration of oikonomia is necessary.
It is clear that the use of the term oikonomia and correlate terms in the Greek world pertains to the place that is regulated, modes of regulation and a hierarchy within the domain of the regulated. 17 All three are at work.
It can be argued that one of the most significant precedents for this use can be found in Aristotle's evocation, in the Politics, of the distinction between the political, whose subject position is identified initially as the plethos, and then, almost in contradistinction, there is the domain of the οικος:
Yet it is clear that if the process of unification advances beyond a certain point, the city will not be a city at all for a city essentially consists of a multitude (plethos), and if its unification is carried beyond a certain point, city will be reduced to family (oikia) and family to individual. (Aristotle 1932 (Aristotle , 1261 ).
While many aspects of this formulation are important, in this instance what is significant is the mode of relationality and thus commonality that defines 15 the object of governance within the city, namely the 'multitude (plethos)'. 18 The contention here is that these relations have to be explicated in terms of the centrality of deliberation and judgement.
Decisions are contestable. Mediacy prevails. The opposite is the case in the oikos. In that instance decisions have a form of inevitability attached to them. Deliberation is redundant and the relation between the elements has an inescapable hierarchy. It is the latter that comes to define the sense of economy that prevails in opposition to the theological. Recalling the terminology that has been used thus far it can be argued that the contestable decision, a decision linked to processes of deliberation, 
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). Reumann suggests in addition that 'God's 'oikonomia' also includes his plans for the last time' (Reumann 1959, 291) . The eschatological future therefore works within the structure of oikonomia. While it might seem a distinctly different sense of the term it is also linked to a form of 16 conciliation. However, the conciliatory involves the maintenance of the community. Hence in her examination of the term in the writings of Basil of Caesarea, Kathy Eden described oikonomia in his work in the following way:
"Oikonomia entails making accommodation to the psychological needs of each individual believer in the service of a unified Christian community.
Here as in Quintilian it subordinates the means to a greater end, a part to a whole" (Eden 1997, 44) . The argument has to be that 'accommodation' is not the same as deliberation and that such a community in involving relations of sameness has had to incoporate the necessity of modes of exclusion and thus both the creation and the inscription of the figure. These are complex and demanding passages. Were it just material, the 'cross' as mere wood, then, the argument would be that the Christians were indeed idolatrous. That the 'cross' is not mere wood is because of its incorporation within a logic of relationality (i.e. within an economy). More significantly the cross becomes necessary because it is 'through the cross', that veneration is possible. The complexity emerges because John
In the Three Treatises on the Divine Images
Damascene takes the Jews to be arguing that the 'wood of the cross' stands for God and therefore that both God and that which stands in relation to
God can be thought outside the confines of this already structured economy. The separation would mean that matter could only ever be symbolic. The important point is that it would be as though there were a mediate relation between matter and God. A mediate relation does not just stand opposed to immediacy it stands opposed to both the immediacy of and contestation between citizens whose identity is given by an original form of relationality rather than the creation of figures to be excluded. This is the other economy, the economy of original mediacy. 2 While it cannot be pursued here it should nonetheless be noted that even the evocation of the term 'image' raises a number of genuine problems. 3 While it cannot be taken up here it needs to be noted that there is another version or permutation of the logic of breath that appears in the evocation of the katechon in 2 Thessalonians. Note the following:
And then the lawless one will be revealed, whom the Lord Jesus will destroy with the breath of his mouth annihilating him by the manifestation of his coming. 2 Thessalonians 2:8
Pursuing the varying permutations of the presence of 'breath' and thus the complexities within the logic of breath is an important task to be taken up in another context. 8 Mekhilta De-Rabbi Ishmael 2004, 321-322. 9 Though this is the challenge presented by Jaś Elsner 2017. 12 While the question of how this conception of world is to be understood cannot be approached directly here an important beginning can be found in Berkovits 2010.
